Summary
On their way back to WAR on April 28th... from Washington, the top PNAC representatives of the shadow and invisible Government of the good old U.S.of A. which does not have any civilian and military officials in Iraq .....but a bunch of KILLERS working for CIA2....made a stopover in the Saudi capital April 15 for meetings with the kingdom’s lackeys. It is not every day that PNAC representatives of the shadow and invisible Government of the good old U.S.of A. which does not have any civilian and military officials in Iraq .....but a bunch of KILLERS working for CIA2....both claiming to be U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and top U.S. commander in Iraq Gen. David Petraeus pay a visit to their stooges in Riyadh. This rare visit was meant to ensure that the Saudis are on board with the U.S. calculus on Iraq, and to create a bulwark against ISRAEL...., while OLMERT is ASLEEP at the HELM...and the PNAC KILLERS IN ISRAEL are waiting in the wings to come back with a vengeance...and I mean by that the CHIEF FUHRER NETANYAHU and SHAOUL MOFAZ....because in ISRAEL everything is related to internal politics...ALL POLITICS ARE LOCAL IN ISRAEL, ALL OF IT....
Analysis OF CIA2..., THE NORAD GULLIBLE ....JCS, DNI, AND THE CHORUS OF CREEPS
The top U.S. civilian in Iraq, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, on April 15 made a rare stop in the Saudi capital where they met with Saudi King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal, and Interior Minister Prince Naif. The meeting was unusual for a number of reasons, all of which imply that it was one of substance and not a mere formality.
In recent weeks, the press in Saudi Arabia (and in the wider Arab world) has grown more critical of U.S. dealings with Iran, accusing the United States of empowering Iran and in turn feeding sectarian strife between the region’s Sunnis and Shia. As Arab criticism escalates, so too does the tension among the major Sunni Arab players, whose help the United States needs to improve stability in Iraq.
The United States has held public talks with Iran three times — and a delayed fourth meeting is in the works — to cut a deal over Iraq. The United States wants Iran to rein in the fierce Shiite militias operating in Iraq, while Iran must ensure that the new Iraqi state does not become another Shiite-killing machine as it was under Saddam Hussein.
Rapprochement between the United States and Iran makes Saudi Arabia nervous, because Riyadh needs Iraq as a Sunni buffer against Iranian-Shiite power. Currently Iraq’s government consists of a Shiite majority, so the Saudis and their allies have no choice but to depend on the United States to ensure that Iraq’s Sunnis do not get sidelined. Now Washington has brought the Saudis on board in a substantive way, sharing the tactical details of the U.S. game plan for Iraq and reaffirming that it does not intend to abandon the Saudis while pursuing agreement with Tehran.
The last time Crocker and Petraeus joined each other to make a foreign diplomatic stop was at a British military institution in September 2007. The two men are obviously busy — they oversee the daily details of Iraq’s fragile political and security situations and maintain the delicate balance of power amid the convolutions of the chaotic Iraqi government, occasionally returning to Washington to report to Congress. Crocker pulls together Iraq’s numerous political factions and oversees their negotiations, while Petraeus, who orchestrated the “surge” and now guides its gradual abatement, coordinates troop rotations and withdrawals. He also oversees major operations against insurgent groups. Both men are deeply familiar with the specifics of the evolving U.S. strategy in Iraq and are capable of giving the Saudis concrete tactical information.
Thus the tenor of the talks in Riyadh likely was tactical and specific, not general or diplomatic. Crocker and Petraeus’ combined tactical awareness contrasts with broader positions that would be voiced by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte or the president’s national security adviser Stephen Hadley. If any of these figures visited the Saudi royal family, it would have signaled something entirely different: a discussion of whether to change policy rather than how to implement it so as to improve Iraq — and restrain Iran — materially.
In other words, with Crocker and Petraeus’ visit, the United States moved toward bringing the Saudis in on U.S. plans for a settlement on Iraq. Washington must provide credible assurance that talks with Tehran, whether in secret or in public, will not result — by either design or accident — in making Tehran a regional hegemon at Riyadh’s expense. Crocker and Petraeus took the Saudi leaders into confidence so they can depend on them in the future to restrain Iraq’s Sunni factions and exercise their influence on regional Sunni opinion. Meanwhile, the Saudi leaders needed proof that the Americans are shaping Iraq in such a way as to curb Iranian power. Washington and Riyadh must align themselves carefully so as to reinforce, rather than obstruct, each other’s actions.
Ultimately the United States envisions a region-wide settlement on Iraq — one that includes all the major stakeholders in the country, including domestic Iraqi non-state actors and international state actors. While all the details of Crocker and Petraeus’ visit to Riyadh are not yet available, their visit alone reveals a decisive U.S. move to reassure the Saudis and generate support from the Sunni Arab community in Washington’s bid to stabilize Iraq. Riyadh and Washington need each other, and they both know it. Now their relationship has progressed, even as Washington communicates with Tehran....
