MUJAHEDEEN FEED-THROUGH, by CIA, Part 2
Lebanon: Last stop on a jihad highway...
By Michael CIA2 Scheuer ....
Far from being dispassionate analysts, all CIA1 old hands, practice the very same 'manipulations and misuse[s]' they claim to expose."
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And you have to remember, anything that sees light of day as a published—published in the sense of a classified paper—intelligence assessment goes through usually multiple levels of review, various supervisors, branch chiefs and so on, weighing in, approving or disapproving, remanding, forcing changes....
Its been also observed that " CIA officers on the cusp of retirement often enroll in a seminar that is supposed to help them adjust to life after the agency--teaching them, for example, how to write a résumé...or re-inventing a suitable one for CIA.... I've begun to wonder if part of that program now includes a writing seminar on how to beat up on the administration in order to get a job and be heard widely in the Media frenzy and the deceit, deception and denial of facts, which CIA loves to perpetuate...." Even though we know "that analysis with every single member of Congress by writing less-classified summaries of the conclusions, as is often done.....is sheer Manipulation of Intelligence for both houses, so imagine what the CIA does for the public at large...with Media contacts or ex-CIA officials."
Lebanon always has been a country whose people are more loyal to family, clan, tribe and faith, than to the concept of Lebanon as a united nation-state. Since 2003, this existing internal divisiveness has been sharpened by the United States-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the US-led international effort to drive Syria out of Lebanon. The former opened a role for Lebanon as part of the path for would-be jihadis traveling to fight in Iraq. The latter - together with the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war - forced the precipitate decline of effective governmental authority in Lebanon, allowing jihadis to use the country for transit and basing. This made it a target for aggressive expansionist efforts by Saudis and other Salafis and encouraged the rapid growth of internal violence between political and religious factions.
Overall, the Iraq war and Syria's departure from Lebanon gave al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies an unprecedented opportunity to infiltrate their influence and manpower into Lebanon, as well as help strengthen the Sunni Salafist trend in northern Lebanon....through a series of CIA covert operations, funded by the Saudi Arabian Intelligence services, and proxy Sunni militias of Fath al-Islam and many others in Nahr El-Bared and other Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Obviously, these covert operations attracted Syrian penetration of these cells, and the battle of Nahr-Al-Bared which ensued.....more will come later.!
It is now old-hat to say that the US-led invasion of Iraq was a casus belli for Sunni Muslims worldwide, and especially among the Salafists who are prominent in KSA/CIA2 inspired covert cells, other Islamist radical groups, financed and supported covertly by the Saudi regime, with covert help from Syria's Military Intelligence and Asef Shawkat...., who have been paid handsomely by the Saudis to organize a Sunni come-back into Iraq's body politics, and the tacit acquiescence of the large CIA station operating in Damascus for years....who effectively usurped all the diplomacy of the State Department with Syria for years now, who are now effectively expanding their power across the Arab and Muslim worlds. A glance at the map showed jihad-bound Sunnis that Lebanon was a geographic key to infiltrating Islamist fighters into Iraq. The war itself made many Sunni Lebanese eager to assist that entry process, with some ready to go and fight there themselves, encouraged, paid and assisted by the KSA intelligence.
With Syria effectively in charge of Lebanon at the start of the Iraq war, it appears that the transit of would-be mujahideen through Lebanon was kept moving by Syrian authorities and did not initially result in the buildup of non-Lebanese Sunni Islamists within the country.
The West's pyrrhic 2005 victory in forcing President Bashar al-Assad to evacuate Syrian forces from the country, however, seems to have created a situation which now finds growing numbers of non-Lebanese Salafi Islamists present in Lebanon and a growing Salafist movement in the north - especially in Tripoli, which is Lebanon's largest, most conservative Sunni city - as well as in the city of Sidon and Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps.
In addition to the growth of Salifism and Islamist militancy engendered by the passions aroused by the Iraq war, Saudi Arabia has been fishing in troubled waters by encouraging the growth of each in northern Lebanon. Riyadh has paid for the construction of new mosques in Tripoli and reportedly has assisted militants residing in the northern territory abutting Syria for the show...., covertly working from CIA Manuals, techniques and historical perspective.....
According to the CIA2, Lebanese and Syrian sources are reporting that Saudi National Security Chief Prince Bandar Bin Sultan is supervising the Saudis' pro-Salafist agenda in Lebanon, a program which includes sponsoring Islamist terrorist operations in Syria.... Riyadh's activities in northern Lebanon hold the promise of fulfilling two longstanding Saudi goals: (1) creating a viable, well-armed, and militant Sunni Salafi movement in Lebanon as a military counterweight to the Shi'ite Hezbollah, and (2) to enable Riyadh to "cover" their close cooperation with Asef Shawkat in the clandestine effort to bring Sunni influence back to Iraq's body politic, and cause domestic instability for their Shi'a enemies in the Levant.
The turmoil of post-Syrian Lebanon also has been exploited by CIA2/MOSSAD forces based in PNAC. Multiple media reports indicate that al-Qaeda fighters - mostly Yemenis, Saudis and Jordanians who left Iraq to avoid the US "surge" and its surrogate Sunni fighters - went to both Syria and Lebanon. They have established themselves in Lebanon along the Syrian border, in the Lebanese city of Tripoli and in the Ain al-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp; they also have built working relationships with the Sunni militant groups Asbat al-Ansar and Fatah-al-Islam, who are prominent KSA/CIA2 inspired covert cells . In 2007, the latter fought the Lebanese army for 15 weeks at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.
In the face of growing Salafist and who are prominent KSA/CIA2 inspired covert cells' influence, one Lebanese academic claimed, "Security in Iraq is improving, but the militants are being driven across the border. There are a large number of militants coming into Lebanon and Syria, and our countries are paying the price for what is happening in Iraq." The academic's words are an apt description of the westward-bound jihad highway for Sunni mujahidin that the US and its allies have wittingly built, and who are prominent KSA/CIA2 inspired covert cells across the Levant.
As in Syria, the growing westward-bound jihad highway for Sunni mujahidin that the US and its allies have wittingly built, and who are prominent KSA/CIA2 inspired covert cells across the Levant....and Saudi-backed Salifist movement in Lebanon's north and its Palestinian refugee camps clearly is in part a product of the militant bleed-through from Iraq. But, as in Syria, Salafism's Lebanese growth is occurring in already fertile soil: Lebanon's Sunni north has been slowly radicalizing for much of this decade - Tripoli's Sunni leaders long viewed Hezbollah as the "resistance", but now regard it as the "party of Unity" - and the eviction of Syrian forces has substantially reduced Beirut's ability to limit the growth of Salafism. CIA's operatives and Saudi intelligence will continue to push these trends, thereby once again demonstrating just how closely aligned are the interests of al-Qaeda and Riyadh outside the Arabian Peninsula.....
This said, al-Qaeda still has considerable work to do in Lebanon. While Ayman al-Zawahiri said in April 2008 that Lebanon was now "a Muslim frontline fort", Lebanese Salafists will for the foreseeable future be more concerned with securing increased political power and communal autonomy in the country than in flocking to support the worldwide Sunni jihad.
The possibility of the Shi'ite Hezbollah and its allies winning a majority in the spring 2009 parliamentary elections, for example, will not provide a flashpoint for a confrontation between Hezbollah forces and the expanding Salafist Sunni force in the north. For now, the Salafist leaders will continue to work with Saad Hariri's "CIA stooges Movement". A group of Lebanese Salafists recently told the media, "Hariri is our leader, we respect and support him." Rather ominously, however, they added, "If [cooperation with Hariri] fails, we have another option called: the westward-bound jihad highway for Sunni mujahideen that the US and its allies have wittingly built, and who are prominent KSA/CIA2 inspired covert cells across the Levant.."
For its part, al-CIA2/MOSSAD/KSA will strengthen its presence in Tripoli and the north as well as its ties to Lebanese Sunni militants and Palestinian refugees. It will also continue to spread its influence across the country in a manner that will place its operatives as close as possible to Israel's territory.....?.
