Friday, December 19, 2008




December 12-14, 2008 -- Michael Hayden is desperate to remain as CIA Director, for he has to keep the "Jewels" from falling into the wrong hands....Crown Jewels about the White House Murder Inc., Jewels about the Shadow Government operating off balance sheets of the GAO...NSA run-amock, rogue operations galore, CIA2 Matrix of assassinations world wide...PNAC to be born-again... etc.


Retired Air Force General Michael Hayden is pulling out all the stops to remain as the head of the CIA under the Barack Obama administration. Hayden has already received the endorsement of House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Sylvestre Reyes (D-TX), who has called on Obama to retain Hayden as CIA director for a period of time similar to the extension in office offered to and accepted by Defense Secretary Robert Gates....and the DNI is in the same uncomfortable situation.... Meanwhile:
As I recall, once in the past a CIA director was appointed at a time when the Agency needed to recover from a reputation for scandal and illegality. At that time President Ford went outside the agency and appointed an experienced politician/diplomat with (AFAIK) no prior connections in the intelligence world - namely George H.W. Bush. My recollection is also that Bush did a rather good job (others may disagree....? ).
Is there some reason why Obama shouldn't do the same....?
Sources say that Obama's team is having trouble finding a potential CIA director who lacks politically incriminating links to controversial Bush Administration policies and yet commands the respect of the agency's rank and file. Potential nominees include John Gannon, a Bush era Homeland Security official and Clinton-era intelligence officer and Jami Miscik, former chief of the CIA's directorate of analysis. The New York source.... reported that New York crisis management consultant Jack Devine, a former CIA chief of operations, is also a potential candidate.

Yesterday, Hayden hosted a day-long ceremony at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia that honored the late Polish Army Colonel and CIA spy Ryszard Kuklinski. Kuklinski spied for the CIA from 1972 until his exfiltration from Poland in November 1981 after Polish counter-intelligence discovered the Polish military high command had a senior spy in its midst. Kuklinski and his family lived under false identities in the United States for a number of years. Kuklinski died in 2004 in Tampa, Florida.

Kuklinski photographed over 40,000 classified documents and provided them or the information derived from them to the CIA via dead drops, rolling hand-offs, and ciphered burst transmissions. Five CIA station chiefs in Warsaw assisted Kuklinski during his espionage mission. The wives of the CIA station chiefs assisted their husbands in site selection for clandestine meetings and dead drops.

Although it is believed that Kuklinski made contact with U.S. intelligence in 1972 during a sail boat excursion from Poland to West Germany, which was, in actuality, a Polish espionage mission on NATO sea defenses, there is a belief by some in the CIA that Kuklinski was recruited when he served in Saigon, South Vietnam during the Vietnam War as a member of the International Control Commission (ICC). The other two members were Canada, representing the West and India, representing the non-aligned bloc. Poland was the only Communist nation with representatives in Saigon during the duration of the Vietnam War. Polish ICC members were targets for recruitment by the CIA station in Saigon as well as by Canadian ICC members working for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and, hence, the CIA.

By the time of the Carter administration, Kuklinski's espionage for the CIA was highly-prized by his fellow Pole, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Hayden's special guest yesterday at the CIA ceremony honoring Kuklinski was Brzezinski, who said "based on Kuklinski's information, a fatal blow was dealt to the imperial structure of the Soviet Union." It was also revealed yesterday that Brzezinski decided to provide direct U.S. military aid to the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviet Union as a way to demonstrate to the Polish Solidarity movement that the U.S. was prepared to assist them directly as well. The Afghan mujahidin gave rise to the Taliban , "Al Qaeda." and all the joint creations of the PNAC murderers of CIA2/MOSSAD and MI6 etc.

After Hayden's and Brzezinski's remarks at the CIA auditorium, they left together. I learned that Hayden's ceremony for Kuklinski has moved Brzezinski to the point where Brzezinski heartily endorses Hayden remaining as CIA director. It is expected that Brzezinski, who is a senior adviser to Obama, will press the president-elect to keep Hayden on board at Langley. Hayden's terms as National Security Agency (NSA) director and Deputy Director of National Intelligence have been controversial for his support for the Bush administration's electronic surveillance and torture/rendition policies.

The CIA ceremony honoring Kuklinski concurrently saw the release of a number of de-classified CIA documents dealing with the intelligence provided by the Polish colonel on Warsaw Pact military strategy and Poland's plans for martial law in 1981.

I was present at the CIA headquarters yesterday for the Hayden-Brzezinski "CIA Polish Day" ceremonies. Hayden quickly skirted past me after I nodded to him while offering a perfunctory greeting...

The CIA has not changed very much from my visits there in xxxx. My return to the agency after ... years, on a day that was rainy and dark, was eerie, to say the least. The "surveillance detection run" by the bus that took the participants in the seminar to another location to be "dog sniffed," prior to driving to the agency, added to the surreality of the day.

CIA employees are still smarting from the Porter Goss regime but also still suffer from the "group think" that has plagued the agency since the foundation of the joint venture of CIA2/MOSSAD/ISI/"Al-Qaeda....

If Obama agrees with Brzezinski and keeps Hayden on as CIA2 director, Obama's problems with the "Democratic wing" of the Democratic Party are certain to increase a thousand folds.....

1. The attached memorandum provides 80VA'o assessment of the most

current intelligence c o a c e t o i ~Polish preparation for martial l a w .

The continued confrontation with Solidarity has caused the Polish

government to prepare extensive plans for the imposition of martial


related to their implementation. 19orurtheleee. this memorandum concludeo

that the regime viawe martial law aa tieky .ob continues to pursue

political s01utiono.

by WOIB agencies,

Directorate of Operations classified.

These plane are now complete, and certain actions have been taken

2. This is a convenience of reference

has hence assigned to the

product of certain of CIA'S

authorited to read only and


SUBJECT: Polish Reparations for Martial Law .
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Director, Deftnee Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, lOatio61 Foreign Aesersment Center
Director of Soviet Analysis
Diractor of 6ihpemAnafysis
DEC 1991

SUBJECTI Polish Preparation for Ehrtial Law
1. The Polish gooe?nmnt ha# completed its plana for igpos%ng
martial law and recent activity is comietent with the fia8l
praparatiorre that would precede the hplement8tioo. of such plans. The
poreibillty that the plans would fail, however, still appears to be
driving tagiee modertitae to find politid eolutione to contentious
issues. If a decision to Implement martial law were taken, m believe
that the Soviets would likely begin parallel preparation8 ranging from
increasiag sacurlty to preparing their own forcee to intervene. We have
ciflc actions in
not, however, obeetoed the Soviets taking any 6
preparation for a major commttarant of force.
The Martial Law Programe
2. As described by seaclitive lntdligence sources the Polieh plan
for martial law has been preparad for use in several SceOafios. The
full martial law programB ach hu been approved by Jamcelski, would
involve a large-scale repreraion of all antigovermeant elements. Polieh
plannera aee this progrm as a mdft, rurprise operation intended to
simultaneously eliminate the opposition leadership, and we the threat
of force and legal saactione to subdue general unrest. Reserves would
be mobilized and individuals cowcripted for unlimited durations, while
workers would find their industries "dlitrrized" and thamelvae under
essentially military roles and aanctiaos. Baric freedom of internal
movementBcomwxnications, and othervise lawful assembly and association
"E: This memorandum was prepared ln the Office of Soviet Analysis,
ament Centera belracted to clllef, (
would k oavor8ly curtailed or elininated. Selected individrrnlo would
be rounded up for internmeat during the night -lately preceding the
public dieclorura of the martial law decree in a named "Opmratioo
spring." I]
3. In the period from rewral days .to24 hourr precodlq the
declaration of martial law, the Winistry of Internal Affaire (MIA) would
feet unit repdipare for rpacial operrtioor, cdlrcatr firearms, prepareto
confiscate rdio transpitterreceiver sets, rod perfom a mobiliza-
tion expanoion of Ma dtr. The Hiairtry of National Manse (MM))
would bring certain units to full etrength, move selected dtr to
trainlag ana1 ln tha Warraw Military Dietrfctr deploy emergency radio
and radierelaf ryrtemo and generally prepare to perfora physicalsecurity functions.
4. -lately preceding the declaration of martial law, but
after the political decirion to impose it, the MXA Wd relay orders on
the execution of the rpecial operation to units (H-161, and then executa
it (U-6). At the sam time the MtlIl would begin asoumlrq physical
security functiono (E-6) and realing off critic81 areas in Warsaw and
other urban ceaters(8-1).
5. With the actual declaration of martial law, the MA vo'uld
assume control of COPlWIOiCations, selected inrtallations, borderr, etc.,
ae the MND continued its general function of phyeical security while
preparlq to reinforce MIA units if required. In general, those
functione of a confrontational nature appear to be the.purview of the
MIA, with tha pilitary playing a supporting role. Tha other Hiaistriee
would be involved in iesuing legal directions concerning their areas of
reSpoMibilltp and I 1 nting plana such a8 tha mobilization of
certain industries. $""I
6. Sam of the earliest me~&tIvereporting on martial law
indicated that the plaunen were of tM minds With ragcrrd to the timing,
scope, and nature of the program. 00 the one hand, aqments were heard
that the prograa should be lmplamentad in stagar, or ooly In specific
sectore, to rducm the rink of confrontation. On tha other hand, a
position was taken, supported by the results of a dacisioumaker'e
exerciee in the epriag of 1981, that the program's full effectiveness
could only be obtained through ewlft, sudden imple~tation. I

7. wbils tha military still profera
clear preference for tlm
sudden, full program, co~picwus~rurcrsuch c8 the retantion of
trained soldiare generally conform to the outllua for ncreepingn martial
law. The recent introductioo of dlftuy teams into tb countryside is
neither noted nor fmplied in existing llurtial law plans. UooQtheless,
by mung this "extraordinary" step, tha government is sigorlling its
intent to retain both its authority erd legitfmacy. The military romaine
8 reapected institution within Polad. We have previouslyeathated that
the dlitary could be used wftb potentially poritiversrulte if introduced
prior to any outbreak of Plolence-particularly if
their contribution includad not just police functions, but positive
activities, such 98 tha managing of foodstuffs. This lpay be whnt is
being attempted at this the, a the goven~mntsteps up its preseute on
Solidarity, while at the tima retaining au ability to euddenly
apply the full program. jI
The Bvideoce-Military .
8. Recant reporting indiccltao an lncreasad emphasis on activityakin
to final preparation& Sansitive reports indicate that the Chief
of the Cenerel Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Genaral Slwlcki,
reported to the National Defanae Coamfttae oa 14 September that
militarytaeks had been assigned, pereormel had bean electively retrained, and
that unspecified "eeeantial nearurer" had already bean carried out. A
General Staff report, obtained by seansitive sources declares th8t
martial law could be implemented "immediately."

9. Sensitiw reports indicated the need to augmnt atanding
forcee prior to the declaration of martial law, but mphaefzed that this
could be accomplished covertly .nd in strgas. The Polish Anmd Forces
racantly announced that they ware retaining for two months approximately
53,000 aoldiers who bad completed their normal military obligation. The
retention of trained pareonnel brs loog hen a basic feature of the
martial law program. Such retantione, plur the recant appearance of
tents at Polish dlitary and Minimtry of Intarnal
suggest a limited manpower augmentation. 7
The planned fall
coaecriptloll of 60,000 apparently wau be@m on schedule la late
October. A major mobiliutiou of the populace,, mad not take
place until th. application of martial laor under tlp. fall pro-.

. Indoe-flisation appears to be ae much an ob ectlw of efforte to
01 tb populace ar it ie a part of thQ ~iikixtro1.71
10. Another elamant of military preparatioru, mentioned by Siw&cki
is tln deploynut of a nfield communications rytem desigrud to met the
needs of the rtata wartime control system .....The IBID raportad in
dd-September that "latenaive preparatiom" for martial law included the
preparation of the -81~8 of coclwlaicationa for directlag martial law
operationo. \
11. Proper political preparation of the mflitary ir Men by the
MOD ae an hportaut element of a euccesrful mnrtlal law plan.\
The Evidence-Goverment
12. Sensitive aource reporting iapliee that party/goverrment
planailrg har kept paca with the military. The gorsmment ha4 completed
all the legal documentation raquired to iPPplePPeat martial law, and
copies of all public decreas and notices ham already hen printed. A
former1 career party official, who recently left
preparation for at leaut a year, directives from Warsaw sinca Augu8t
have called for renewed anpharis to ensure that they could be quickly
carried out. Provlnce plans Lnclude an evacuation of key govenmeat and
party officialr ad facilities to secure areas where they could be
protected by the Army and State Security forces. Meetings were
reportedly.he1d in Warsaw under the cover of economic discueeione during
which the actual topic wae martial law plans.

13. State security organa ale0 am
law. llhs d.86 official reported that the
of the Citicaoe' Hllitla received orden
quartarm for 300 paopla. by &adera of Solidarity and the opporitlon
groupr mre to be arrested the moaent aart1.l law rrss decreed. Aa of
late Saptambar, that list mmlnred 150 individuals.
Each waa aasigned a sacu~&"&iby ritter"3G'vu to know the target's
avery movement eo that an arrest order could be carried out lmmdiatalp.
Thir information is consistent with tha sensitive reports of "Operation
The Political Factor
14. The failure of the regins to we its repraesive apparatus up
to now haa not been due to a lack of plannlq or preparatione, but to
the realisation that no mtte'l: bow good the plaar ware, they run serious
risk of fdling to restore order and leading to some kind of civil
war. The factor of surprise would @ve the regiae only a temporaryadvantage.
It seeme unlikely that, once de, tba early steps in
implamentation of martial law could be kept aacret. A0 a result,
efforts to round up Solidarity activistr might only be partiallysuccassful.
The ramainder, dth much of the work force, would
spontaneously stage sit-in strikes. Attempts to evict them would likelylead
to bloodshed and sttetqtbniag of the workers' will to resist.
15. The regima also cannot count on the reliability of many of its
own forcas. Seneltive reportlag lndlc8tes that tha Polish HOD is aware
that a signrficant number of conscripts are already nmbars of
Solidarity, with many of the remainder in complete sympathy. The
Province official reports that the cannaadera of two Polish

v e OPII (both of which fsatuma martial law plana) do not feel that
their soldiers can be expected to obey ordare to use force againstcivilians.
The most these coamnders hope for le that their soldiers
dll obey orders to remain io their krracks'or to move to remote
biwuc locations to avoid contact with the population and probable
occupation forces from the Uarrraw Pact. Both reported a sense that
their ttoOp8 might usa their weapons against any outside intervention
forces. The same official reports that the commmdant of the Province
Citiaen'e Mlitla even hae doubte about his most trusted udt-the
mtorized Reserve, or "ZOMO"-a highly trsinad security unit used fn
crisis eituations. Complementing these general iadicatiohs are the
letters sent recently to Solidarity by conscripts of the Jelinia Cora
ad Lublin Provinces, They arpre8aed dissatiafaction.uith the extention
of their aervlce and declared support for Solidarity. They felt that
actions agalnet Selidarity -re the real reaeon behind their retention
and they rejected euch a role. I(
16. The Polish pirty/ditary leadership le deeply dlvlded on the
use of force. lRwrow reports from extdy aensitivo eourcee have
indicated that senior officialr in the Ministries of Defeaee and
Interior have been the strongest proponents of martial law. Thore who
have argued againat Irrrtial law will cane under increased pressure to
glve in if ecoaodc conditions worsen significantly in the coming months
and lead to extensive strike activity. Boan then, however, they would
probably argue that martial law met be carefully tailored to specific
conditione. I]
17. Jaruzelski -elf is reported by sensitive ~ourcesto be in
favor of martial law, and he certainly is seeking to lirait coocessioaa
to Solidarity. Nonetheless, Us public behavior still indicates that he
prefers a course of political act-ation, and apparently doea not
coasider current conditione propitious for the introduction of martial
The Soviets Role
18. The extent of the Soviets' role in recent events remains
unclear. Senritive raportilrg indicated that the Soviet leadership waa
in frequent ddirect contact with Jaruttlalri prior to the 17 October
Party Pleuum without the knowledgp of Kanto. They may, therefore, have
had extensive prior lurowledge of the Plenum's activities, and could have
influenced Jamelski. The eudden return of Soviet Merehal hlikov for
one day to mecowZ l f r m East Germany where he WBB
observing an arc me, may cafe that the Soviete were anticipating
significant Polish events.

19. The Soviets have advised the Polish government in its
preparations for mrrtial law. In fact, all public decrees on the
program have been ptlnted in the Soviet Union. In addition, in July,
Soviet General Staff officero vlrited Warsaw and worked with Polimh
General Staff offlcera for a period of time. There is 110 doubt,
therefore, that thy are aware of the details of the plan. Although we

barn 00 direct evidence that the Soviet6 would be privy to a Polish
decieloa to impose martial law, olb believe that would be the case.
m I-
20. Prior Soviet knowledge of 8 Polirh deci8ion to fmpoee martial
law dlikely result in some Soviet dlltary preparations, if only to
ineraare recurity of forcer already in Poland.Current reporto of Soviet
military activities indicate such preparatlona are not under uay. A
oingle uncorroborated l"Treport, however, indicated that logisticactivity
which may have been related to Poland waa to have begun on 1
Nommber. At that time, the report indicates, the Soviets would place a
hold on large portions of their road, rail, air, and aea transportationsystem
8 in the areas bordering Poland for a four-week period. There are
no positive indicationa that this has occurred. Earlier in October, a
reliabla, trained source reported that during the latter part of
September, the Soviets had instructed the Cz~chorlovakianHinirtry of
Tramportation to reserve rmfPbera of rail cars for use by the
military. Soviet officials stressed that the action was being taken a8
a contingency based on poeoible difficulties with Solidarity and that
there wua no causa for alarm. Should the reportg on the Soviet
transport preparations prove accurate, bowewer, they would be a
significant indication that the Soviets are anticipating aom massive
logistic operation, and have an idea of its general time-frame.

Ryszard Kuklinski

Ryszard KuklinskiAKA Ryszard Jerzy Kuklinski

Born: 13-Jun-1930
Birthplace: Warsaw, Poland
Died: 10-Feb-2004
Location of death: Tampa, FL
Cause of death: Stroke

Gender: Male
Race or Ethnicity: White
Sexual orientation: Straight

Nationality: Poland
Executive summary: Polish Cold War era spy who worked with CIA

Military service: Polish Army

Wife: Joanna Kuklinski
Son: Bogdan Kuklinski (d. boating accident)
Son: Waldemar Kuklinski (d. car accident)
Father: (d. Sachsenhausen)

Treason convicted in absentia, later rescinded
Espionage convicted in absentia, later rescinded
Naturalized US Citizen
Stroke 5-Feb-2004

Most damning of all is the fact that Bob Gates was one of the founders
of al Qaeda, the CIA's Arab Legion which was assembled to attack the
Soviets in Afghanistan:

According to former CIA Director Robert Gates's memoir From the
Shadows, the big expansion of the US covert operation in Afghanistan
began in 1984. During this year, "the size of the CIA's covert program
to help the Mujahidin increased several times over," reaching a level
of about $500 million in US and Saudi payments funneled through the
Zia regime in Pakistan. As Gates recalled, "it was during this period
[1985] that we began to learn of a significant increase in the number
of Arab nationals from other countries who had traveled to Afghanistan
to fight in the Holy War against the Soviets. They came from Syria,
Iraq, Algeria, and elsewhere, and most fought with the Islamic
fundamentalist Muj groups, particularly that headed by Abdul Resaul
Sayyaf. We examined ways to increase their participation, perhaps in
the form of some sort of 'international brigade,' but nothing came of
it. Years later, these fundamentalist fighters trained by the
Mujaheddin in Afghanistan would begin to show up around the world,
from the Middle East to New York City, still fighting their Holy War ­
only now including the United States among their enemies. Our mission
was to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. We expected a post-Soviet
Afghanistan to be ugly, but never considered that it would become a
haven for terrorists operating worldwide." (Gates 349) But the
international brigade Gates talked about was in fact created ­ as the
group now known as al Qaeda. (Tarpley, 9/11 Synthetic Terror, pp.
139-140 )

Anatomy of "a" Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War

"On a secret visit by the CIA director to plan strategy for the war against
Soviet forces in Afghanistan, helicopters lifted CIA director William Casey
to three secret training camps near the Afghan border, where he watched
mujahidin rebels fire heavy weapons and learn to make bombs with
CIA-supplied plastic explosives and detonators.

During the visit, Casey startled his Pakistani hosts by proposing that they
take the Afghan war into enemy territory -- into the Soviet Union itself.
Casey wanted to ship subversive propaganda through Afghanistan to the Soviet
Union's predominantly Muslim southern republics. The Pakistanis agreed, and
the CIA soon supplied thousands of Korans, as well as books on Soviet
atrocities in Uzbekistan and tracts on historical heroes of Uzbek
nationalism, according to Pakistani and Western officials.