Americans and Iraqis died while U.S. took no action against identified Mahdi Army bomb cell
WMR has learned from a private military contractor source who, in 2007, worked at Tallil Air Base in Iraq, that he was given a list of members of a bomb detonation cell working within Muqtada al Sadr's Shi'a militia, the Mahdi Army or "Jaish al Mahdi," but no action was taken by the U.S. military. The inaction by senior US military officers and US intelligence and law enforcement agencies cost the lives of a number of U.S. military service personnel and Iraqi civilians.
On April 8, 2009, WMR reported: "WMR has been informed by a former private military contractor in Iraq that the United States was aware of the identities and even the cell phone numbers of several bomb making operatives within Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army. The bomb cells were responsible for detonating a number of bombs in Iraq that targeted Sunnis and coalition personnel, including Americans."
WMR has obtained the list of Mahdi Army bomb cell operatives who targeted U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. The unit worked closely with Iranian intelligence agents active in Iran. Iran's government denied, at the time, any connection to the bombing attacks in Iraq. The CIA, FBI, and U.S. military intelligence and criminal investigators failed to act against the bomb cell because they were ordered by senior officers in the military chain-of-command, including General David Petraeus, the then-Commanding General of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and his predecessor, General George Casey, later promoted to Army Chief of Staff, not to put in jeopardy a six month extension of a cease-fire agreement agreed to by the MNF-I and al Sadr's Shi'a militia in 2006. The US ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, also participated in the conspiracy to avoid taking down the Mahdi Army bomb cell, according to WMR's sources.
In February 2007, the first Petraeus "surge" troops began arriving in Iraq. During 2006, the Mahdi Army was on a virtual bombing spree aimed at Sunnis and foreign forces in Iraq. In 2007, in cooperation with the U.S. "surge," al Sadr agreed to a cease fire in his civil war against the Sunnis of Iraq but his bomb cell, known to US military commanders, was permitted to operate freely. Although a list of some of the bombers was provided to Petraeus and his command, he took no action to bring those who committed acts of terror against U.S. and coalition forces to justice. Petraeus changed the subject by blaming terrorist acts in Iraq on "Al Qaeda."
The Mahdi Army bomb cell list had been passed to a coalition intermediary from a friendly Iraqi asset at great risk to the safety of the asset and his family. Because of the sensitivity of the list, only extracts gleaned from it follow. The list was provided to the US Army's Criminal Investigative Division (CID) at Tallil Air Base in 2007, but no action was taken. In fact, the list was called bogus by military and CIA personnel. The partial publication of the information found in the list reflects an editorial decision by WMR to protect the source of the list and the source's potential contacts inside the Mahdi Army and Iranian intelligence who volunteered the information:
- the arms supply network for the Mahdi Army originated in Maraghen, Iran and terminated in the Karrada district of Baghdad.
- Mahdi Army officers placed orders for weapons and bomb making supplies in Karrada and these were sent to Maraghen to be filled by Iranian intelligence intermediaries.
- A father and son team in Jaderiya, Baghdad was responsible for bomb making and arranging the planting of devices. This team of Akiel Salam Hamid, nicknamed "Al Iranie," and his kingpin father, Hussein Salim Hamid, was tasked with counting military vehicles in the area of Jaderiya and selected targets and build roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) consisting mainly of Semtex. Their mobile number, 07702 668 185, and Iraqi government-issued land line number, 7786495, the former of which could have been of great use to National Security Agency (NSA) signals intelligence analysts to determine the team's locations and plans, was apparently never utilized as "actionable intelligence."
The Jaderiya father-son team made the bomb that exploded outside the Fiqma ice cream shop in Karrada on August 1, 2007. Some two dozen Iraqi civilians were killed. Three U.S. soldiers were killed the same day by a roadside bomb in Baghdad. They were Army Staff Sgt. Fernando Santos, 29, San Antonio; Army Spc. Cristian Rojas-Gallego, 24, Loganville, Georgia.; and Army Spc. Eric D. Salinas, 25, Houston. The three were assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington. The number of US troops killed by Mahdi bomb cell IED explosions could number in the hundreds but the Pentagon is keeping many of the details on these attacks and their victims classified. WMR can report that officers of the US Air Force at Tallil Air Base, as well as US Army officers and criminal investigators at the Department of Defense, were informed about the Mahdi Army bomb cell but no action was taken. WMR is prepared to release the names of those officers and agents who were provided the information about the bomb cell if we are not provided with answers to questions about why no action was taken to protect American troops and Iraqi civilians from the Shi'a militia bombing attacks.
That attack was blamed by US military commanders on Iran but the same commanders had failed to eliminate the bomb making cell when provided with critical intelligence on its composition and methods of operation. The multiple August 1, 2007 bombings in Baghdad that killed over 70 people caused the Sunni Accordance Front bloc, including Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zobaie, to quit the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi cabinet of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
US military authorities were also provided with the mobile numbers of two assassins working for Hussein Salim Hamid, 079022 72814 and 07902272814. The latter was used by a top Mahdi Army coordinator of bombings and assassinations targeting U.S. military personnel and Iraqi civilians.
WMR has also learned of a secret and steady shipment of mortars by U.S. forces into Iraq. The shipment of mortars created a feud between MNF-I commander, General Casey, and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. Talabani was furious when he learned that the U.S. was shipping mortars into Iraq at the same time the Iraqi government was trying to destroy its own stockpile. On August 31, 2005, mortar fire directed at Shi'a pilgrims allegedly by "Al Qaeda" leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who WMR previously reported was provided sanctuary in Qatar by the Qatari Interior Ministry, for whom Rudolph Giuliani's security company had a security contract, resulted in a stampede on a bridge over the Tigris River. The bridge collapsed from the panicked crowd and 840 people were killed. The incident caused Talabani to urge the elimination of mortars stockpiled in Iraq.
WMR sources also report that the US military also once secretly shipped 99 Glock silencers into Iraq, the purpose of which is not known but silencers are normally used for assassinations carried out by the infamous White House Murder INC, in the Levant for decades.....